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Abstract
We study how Chinese textile and clothing firms adjusted the product structure
of their exports to the US, as triggered by the termination of Multifiber Arrangement
(MFA) quotas. We find that the removal of MFA quotas induced firms to expand
their product scope while reducing the concentration on their core product. These
effects are strong for domestic and foreign privately-owned firms, but insignificant
for state-owned firms.
Highlights: I Quota removal induces firms to export new products. I Quota re-
moval induces firms to shift resources away from their core products. I State-owned
firms are less affected by the quota removal than their private counterparts.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known both theoretically and empirically that import quotas lead to higher
quality products being exported (e.g. Feenstra, 1988; Harrigan and Barrows, 2009; Khan-
delwal et al., 2013). However, it is not yet clear how quotas affect the reallocation of
resources across export products within firms. This paper provides evidence on this
question by showing how Chinese firms adjust the scope and concentration of their tex-
tile and clothing products exported to the US market following the abrupt termination
of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas in 2015.
Our research is closely linked to the recent literature on multi-product firms, which
highlights firms’ product-mix adjustments in response to trade liberalization (e.g. Arko-
lakis et al., 2015; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Bernard et al., 2010, 2011; Eckel and Neary,
2010; Goldberg et al., 2010; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014; Qiu and
Zhou, 2013). A common feature of these studies is that firms reorganize the scope and
concentration of their export products under specific market conditions. To the extent
that the effect of a quota is equivalent to an increase per (physical) unit cost (Demidova
et al., 2009; Falvey, 1979; Feenstra, 2003; Khandelwal et al., 2013), the end of the MFA
presents a clear-cut, exogenous, and discrete episode of trade liberalization which allows
us to identify within-firm adjustments following an abrupt removal of a specific type of
trade barrier.
2 Data and Research Design
Our data on Chinese exports to the US come from a transaction-level database provided
by Chinese Customs, spanning 2002–2006. Quota products (HS8 level) are identified
using the list provided by China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Tex-
tiles (2002). Established in 1994, the MFA enables developed countries (including the
US) to set quantity caps on textile and clothing imports from developing countries; see
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Khandelwal et al. (2013) for more details of this trade data and the policy background
of the MFA. The MFA quotas remained in place until January 1st 2005, at which point
all quantity caps were dismantled.
The clear timing of the quota removal and the variation in the extent to which
firms were constrained by the quotas allow us to use a Difference-in-Differences (DiD)
framework to identify the effect of the MFA quota elimination. The DiD regression takes
the following form:
yit = α+ T
′
tβ + TD
′
itδ + θi + εit, (1)
where i and t index firm and year; yit is the outcome variable, namely the number of
export products or the concentration of export products; α is the constant term; Tt is
a vector containing year dummies with the omitted year being 2002; TDit contains all
interactions between the elements of Tt and indicators of comparison groups Di; θi is
a firm fixed effect;1 εit is a zero mean error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the
covariates; all other parameters are coefficients to be estimated. The key coefficients
of interest are in the vector δ, which captures how the differences between firms varies
across years. In particular, δ2005 and δ2006 capture the DiD estimate of the effect of quota
removal on firms’ product scope and concentration for the years immediately following
quota removal. In addition, δ2003 and δ2004 capture any pre-quota removal effect relative
to the base year.
3 Results
For the main part of the analysis, we define export product scope as the number of
products exported (at the HS8 level), and we define export product concentration as the
share of the top product in export value, as in Bernard et al. (2011). We restrict the
sample to pure textile and clothing firms, defined as those who exported only textile and
1Note that the inclusion of firm fixed effects absorbs the main effects of group indicators Dit.
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Table 1. Chinese textile and clothing exporters to the US
Number of firms Share of export value %
Year Mixed Quota
Non-
quota
Total Mixed Quota
Non-
quota
Total
2002 573 415 403 1,391 67.2 19.2 13.7 100
2003 811 498 526 1,835 70.4 15.2 14.4 100
2004 1,093 656 697 2,446 71.8 14.3 13.9 100
2005 1,970 3,071 960 6,001 61.7 28.9 9.4 100
2006 2,003 3,425 1,196 6,624 58.5 29.8 11.7 100
Notes: “Mixed” refers to firms who exported both quota and non-quota textile
and clothing products at least once in the sample period, “Quota” refers to
firms who exported only quota-constrained textile and clothing products in all
years, and “Non-quota” refers to firms who exported only non-quota textile
and clothing products in all years. Textile and clothing products are those
products included in the Harmonized System (HS) chapters 50-63.
clothing products to the US. Products may be “quota” or “non-quota”, meaning that
they were subject to quota restrictions for export to the US in 2004.2 The sample is
split into three comparison groups:
1. Firms who exported quota and non-quota products to the US (“Mixed”);
2. Firms who exported only quota products to the US (“Quota”);
3. Firms who exported only non-quota products to the US (“Non-quota”).
Non-quota firms are a natural control group. Table 1 contains summary statistics for
this sample. It is shown that mixed firms made up the largest part of the sample both
in terms of numbers of firm and in terms of the value of exports before 2005, but after
the quota removal they were significantly outnumbered by quota firms due to the influx
of relatively smaller firms selling previously quota-constrained products to the US. We
include firm fixed effects throughout our DiD estimations to control for the influence of
the changes in the composition of the firms.
2Here we do not consider whether quotas are binding or not, because a “binding quota” is a concept
that applies in aggregate. When individual firms apply for a quota, especially in the Chinese context,
whether the quota is binding at the country level is not necessarily relevant to them. State firms are less
bound by quotas, and private firms more likely to be bound by quotas, even if the quotas are binding
at the country level; see Yang (1999) and (Moore, 2002, Ch. 5) for more details on the MFA quota
allocation system in China.
3
Table 2. The effect of quota removal: comparison of quota and non-quota firms
Product scope Product concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All firms
Private
domestic
State-
owned
Foreign-
owned
All firms
Private
domestic
State-
owned
Foreign-
owned
δ2003 −0.065 −0.104 0.557 −0.162 0.005 0.009 −0.112 0.029
(0.365) (0.441) (0.860) (0.881) (0.022) (0.028) (0.072) (0.047)
δ2004 −0.173 −0.238 0.953 −0.262 0.018 0.039 −0.135∗ 0.005
(0.373) (0.451) (0.919) (0.875) (0.022) (0.028) (0.077) (0.046)
δ2005 1.154
∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗ 0.998 1.976∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.206∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.446) (0.987) (0.841) (0.022) (0.028) (0.083) (0.044)
δ2006 1.077
∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗ −0.088 1.856∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.135 −0.116∗∗
(0.376) (0.455) (1.023) (0.857) (0.023) (0.028) (0.086) (0.045)
N 18,297 12,648 828 4,821 18,297 12,648 828 4,821
R2 0.780 0.772 0.776 0.798 0.744 0.735 0.678 0.777
Notes: table reports estimates of the elements of δ from (1). Product scope is measured as the
number of products, and product concentration the highest share of a single product in a firm’s
exports. The DiD comparison is between quota firms and non-quota firms. Firm fixed effects are
included in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses; ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Column (1) of Table 2 presents our baseline results for the effects of quota removal
on product scope, in which we compare quota firms with non-quota firms. Product
scope does not diverge between these two groups of firms before 2005 (estimates of
δ2003 and δ2004 are not significantly different from zero). But in 2005, product scope
expands significantly more in quota firms (by about 1.2 products), and this difference
remains in 2006. Column (5) shows the same comparison for for product concentration.
The average share of the top product shows no divergence between quota and non-
quota firms before 2005, but concentration falls significantly more in quota firms from
2005 onwards. These findings provide clear and consistent evidence that the removal of
quotas induces significant readjustments within firms: exporters tend to diversify their
export portfolios by expanding their product scope and by more evenly spreading out
their resources across export products, which accords with the prediction of some recent
theories about the effects of reduced trade costs on multi-product firms (e.g. Bernard
et al., 2011).
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The remaining columns of Table 2 shows how this effect varies across different firm
ownership types. Comparing δ2005 with δ2004, it can be seen that the increase in product
scope is largest for foreign-owned firms. The decrease in product concentration is also
larger for foreign-owned than private domestic firms. Estimates of the response of state-
owned firms are imprecise, but it is clear that there is no sudden increase in product
scope after 2005, and in 2006 the DiD estimate is close to zero for state-owned firms.
There is some evidence of a reduction in concentration for state-owned firms, but again
the timing of this change is not consistent with the timing of the quota removal.
More precise results are obtained when we consider within-firm variations. Specifi-
cally, the existence of mixed firms in the sample (which exported both quota and non-
quota products) allows us to identify the quota removal effect by comparing product
scope and concentration within firms. In practice, we estimate (1) on the sample of
mixed firms only, defining Di = 1 for quota products and Di = 0 for non-quota prod-
ucts. Dyadic firm-product fixed effects are included to control for the changes in sample
composition and any other unobserved effects at the firm-product level. The results are
reported in Table 3. Compared to the cross-firm estimation in Table 2, this estima-
tion exercise shows much stronger effects and much sharper differences across ownership
types. In particular, state-owned firms are now consistently less responsive to the lift of
quotas than private domestic and foreign-owned firms. For both product scope and prod-
uct concentration, the size of the estimated effect for state-owned firms is roughly a half
or less of the effects for other firms. The relative lack of responsiveness of state-owned
firms echoes the existing finding that state-owned firms in China were less constrained
by quota restrictions (Khandelwal et al., 2013; Moore, 2002; Yang, 1999), and more im-
portantly it points to the fact inefficient management of quotas by the government could
lead to resource misallocation and thus an exogenous removal of quotas could result in
“greater-than-expected gains” (Khandelwal et al., 2013).
If we exclude single-product firms which exported only one product to the US in
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Table 3. The effect of quota removal: comparison of quota and non-quota products within
firms that export both
Product scope Product concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All
Private
domestic
State-
owned
Foreign-
owned
All
Private
domestic
State-
owned
Foreign-
owned
δ2003 0.180 0.413 −0.641 −0.005 −0.016 −0.033 0.060 0.015
(0.306) (0.363) (0.775) (0.677) (0.019) (0.023) (0.072) (0.039)
δ2004 0.682
∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗−0.559 0.581 −0.008 −0.029 −0.037 0.049
(0.308) (0.363) (0.905) (0.680) (0.019) (0.023) (0.084) (0.039)
δ2005 3.651
∗∗∗ 3.546∗∗∗ 1.697∗ 4.901∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗−0.061 −0.116∗∗∗
(0.299) (0.353) (0.904) (0.652) (0.018) (0.022) (0.084) (0.038)
δ2006 3.862
∗∗∗ 3.766∗∗∗ 1.498 5.146∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗−0.086 −0.105∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.364) (0.949) (0.658) (0.019) (0.023) (0.088) (0.038)
N 10,077 6,909 400 2,768 10,077 6,909 400 2,768
R2 0.775 0.757 0.804 0.810 0.721 0.708 0.704 0.751
Notes: see notes for Table 2. The DiD comparison is between quota products and non-quota
products in mixed firms.
2004, we find the effects on product scope and product concentration to have the same
signs as in baseline results, but none remain significantly different from zero, implying
a stronger response of single-product exporters than multi-product exporters. If we
focus only on the subset of products which firms exported consecutively in 2004 and in
2005, the estimation gives slightly smaller estimates and most of them lose statistical
significance, indicating that the baseline findings are largely driven by the net addition
of export products.
Our main results are robust to two alternative methods. First, using a Herfindahl
index as an alternative product concentration measure, we find the overall effect on
Herfindahl index is a decrease of 0.11 (less concentrated), which is significantly different
from zero at 5% level. Second, we can also use the US and Japanese markets for a DiD
comparison, by comparing quota firms’ exports to the US (as a developed market with
MFA quotas before 2005) versus quota firms’ exports to Japan (as a developed market
without MFA quotas before 2005). This comparison yields larger effects (1.6 for product
scope and −0.1 for product concentration), both of which are significant at the 1% level.
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4 Conclusions
Chinese exporters responded to the removal of MFA quotas in the US by adding on
average 1.2 new products to their export portfolios and shifting resources towards less
important products by lowering the share of the best-selling product by 0.9 percentage
points. Domestic and foreign privately owned firms, and firms which exported both
quota and non-quota products exhibited larger adjustment. This finding implies that
the existence of quotas forces incumbent firms to concentrate more on their products
of core competence and thus becoming “leaner and meaner” in the export market. A
promising avenue of research would be to theoretically investigate the full effects of
quotas in a multi-product firm framework such as Bernard et al. (2011) and Eckel and
Neary (2010) and evaluate the welfare implications.
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